We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an e¤ect occurs even if the cost is wasteful when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough. If the cost is recouped such as with a poll tax, having a cost is always bene…cially.
A common method to reach a decision is to have a vote. 1 Since each member of the committee has information that is relevant to the decision, we would normally think that ensuring all participate in voting would improve the …nal outcome. In fact, many countries (including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, and Greece) have compulsory voting to ensure inclusion. 2 There is, however, signi…cant di¤erence between aggregating private values and ensuring full participation of all voters.
In social valuation, the strength of preference counts. In voting, the options for expressing preference for any particular alternative are limited to either voting for it, or not voting for it (that is, vote for an alternative or abstain). 3 This means with voting it is not possible to demonstrate intensity of preferences. 4 One voter mildly in favor of an alternative exactly o¤sets another voter who is strongly opposed.
These observations suggest that there may be gains, in avoiding poor outcomes, by ensuring that voters who have only mild feelings about the alternatives are excluded. In some sense, if their vote counts for more than their strength of feeling then they may change the voting outcome in a detrimental way. Indeed, in Australia where voting is mandatory, "donkey votes" (those that simply were cast by order of a ballot) give a 1% edge to those listed …rst (see Orr, 2002, and King and Leigh, 2009) . One way to exclude such voters is to ensure that there is a cost to voting that deters participation by those without strong preferences (or are not well informed) and hence achieve a socially-better outcome. This intuition is contrary to the widely held view that costly 1 See Drexl and Klein (2013) and Gershkov et al. (2013) . 2 Enforcement ranges from …nes (Australia) to disenfranchisement (Belgium) or making it di¢cult to obtain a passport or driver's license (see The Guardian, July 4, 2005) . 3 Among the rare exceptions are reality TV shows such as Pop Idol where individuals can vote more than once (and pay for each vote). 4 As mentioned by Mueller (2003, page 104) : "Majority rule records only these ordinal preferences for each individual on the issue pair. The condition for the Pareto optimality of the supply of the public goods requires information on the relative intensity of individual preferences." voting is detrimental since it deters voting (and is a cost to those that do vote) leading to a paradox of why people vote (see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002 , for an overview).
In this paper, we show that increasing costs even though they are wasteful may be bene…cial using a model with a continuous distribution of values both when there is a …xed number of supporters for each outcome and when there is aggregate supporter uncertainty. We …nd that whether costly voting is superior depends upon both the expected value and the density of lower value voters. We also show that under aggregate supporter uncertainty, a government would never want to have mandatory voting by imposing …nes or subsidizing voting but would wish to implement a poll tax (a charge for voting) if it is politically practical.
This analysis can be seen as the normative counterpart to the positive analyses of Bulkley et al. (2001) and Osborne et al. (2000) . These papers establish that when voting is costly the outcome of the voting game will have an equilibrium in which only voters with high values (from the extremes) will participate. Again, at …rst sight it might appear that this is a bad outcome since it excludes moderate opinion. What we show is that instead it can be e¢cient to have precisely such an equilibrium. Börgers (2000) asks a question in the spirit of our analysis. Namely, whether a reduction of the costs of voting can be damaging. While he graphically, shows such a possibility, in his model, enough of a reduction would always be bene…cial, since while there is uncertainty for which alternative a voter prefers, there is no di¤erence in intensity of preference for a particular alternative. 5 More recently, Börgers (2004) further analyzes this type of model to show that an equilibrium with costly voting is superior to both mandatory voting (still with voting costs) and random selection of a winner (with no voting). Thus, mandatory voting has the bene…t of including all the available information (everyone votes) and selecting the best alternative, but at the highest cost. Random selection has the lowest cost but uses no information. The tradeo¤ between mandatory voting and random selection is voluntary voting. This causes only those with a low cost of voting to vote and is superior to the other options. Krasa and Polborn (2009) vary the Börgers model by allowing for 5 It is possible to see how Börgers (2000) works with a simple numerical example: There are two voters, V 1 and V 2, and two candidates, A and B. Each voter has a 50% chance of preferring each candidate and values their candidate winning at 1 (and the other at 0). If the cost of V 1 voting is 0:5 and V 2 voting is 0:5 2 , then both will vote and the total surplus will be 1:5 1 + 3 : If costs increase such that the cost of V 1 voting is 0:5 + and V 2 voting is 0:5 , then only V 2 would vote yielding a surplus of 1:5 0:5 + . Of course, if voting costs drop to zero, both will vote and surplus will be 1:5.
ex-ante asymmetry of preferences over alternatives. They …nd that for a large enough number of voters, it is optimal to move towards mandatory voting from voluntary voting (by a penalty for not voting or a subsidy to voting).
In our paper, we add intensity of preferences over alternatives. Now in contrast to the Börgers model (and Krasa and Polborn), everyone voting no longer includes all information (it neglects intensity of preference) and thus sometimes does not select the best alternative. We …nd that even if we eliminate all costs to mandatory voting by setting the cost of voting to zero, it may not necessarily be superior. Note that unlike Ledyard (1981 Ledyard ( , 1984 , we treat the alternatives as …xed (as does Börgers) and thus …nd that the equilibrium is ine¢cient.
To help understanding how we di¤er from the existing literature, let us return to our example of a committee voting on an issue. The committee can (1) make it mandatory to show up to the meeting (compulsory), (2) buy cookies for the meeting (inducement), (3) allow for electronic voting (zero cost), (4) schedule the meeting late at night (create cost), or (5) charge a fee to show up to the meeting (perhaps by means of additional work at the meeting). Börgers (2004) shows that (1) or (2) would not be worthwhile and Börgers (2000) shows (4) may be bene…cially. We add to this by con…rming those results in our model and in showing that surprisingly (3) may not be bene…cial and that (5) will always be bene…cial. 6 We also show (4) may be bene…cial even if there is an equal number of supporters for each alternative.
Our paper also relates to the public good provision literature. Palfrey and Ledyard (1994 , 1999 , 2002 look at mechanisms including simple voting schemes for providing public goods. In Palfrey and Ledyard, the voting options are to provide or not provide a public good where provision could have a loss for those that have little value for it and have to pay for it. In this paper we have two options each with non-negative value and voting can potentially have a cost.
While less related, the Condorcet Jury literature models voting by a group of individuals with a common value over two alternatives (see Young, 1988) . Krishna and Morgan (2012) show that as the cost of voting goes to zero, voluntary voting is the optimal mechanism. Ghoshal and Lockwood (2009) have combined the common value in the Condorcet Jury literature with the private value of alternatives and comparisons in Börgers (2004) . They …nd that if the voters put a high weight on personal preferences then there is an ine¢ciently high voter turnout and in the case voters care more about the common aspect then there is an ine¢ciently low voter turnout. Information acquisition has been studied in the Condorcet Jury literature by allowing voters to buy information about the common feature of the alternatives (see Persico, 2004, Gerardi and Yariv, 2005) .
The lobbying literature models a similar problem (see Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992 , Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1993 , Che and Gale, 1998 , Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006 . The method of reaching a group decision is by allowing would-be voters to send a signal of how much they care: by lobbying. With this method, we would expect that voters with strong preferences or special interest groups to have greater in ‡uence on the outcome than with voting. This is due to the ability of voters with more extreme preferences to send a stronger signal. Such undue in ‡uence is not necessarily harmful; lobbying may be welfare enhancing over voting since under voting the outcome can be determined by a large number of voters that do not strongly care about the outcome or vote without any information about the speci…c issues. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2010), we determine under which conditions, a purely wasteful signal (which we call shouting) will lead to a more e¢cient solution than voting. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013) , for purely private goods, we …nd the optimal allocation mechanism when only wasteful signals can be used and determine under which conditions making use of these signals is useful.
In the next section, we provide an illustrative example with two types and two voters which gives the basic intuition of our model. In section, 3, we examine our model when there is an equal number of voters supporting each option and the uncertainty in the model is in the strength of each voter's support for the option. Then in section 4, we analyze the case where, in addition to the uncertainty of the strength, there is uncertainty as to which alternative a voter supports. We conclude in section 5.
Illustrative Example
Here we provide basic example that captures the main intuition of our paper. There are two options, A and B, and two voters: one prefers A and the other prefers B. There is an 1=2 chance that a voter has utility of v` 1 for his preferred option (and 0 for the other) and 1=2 chance of utility of v h 5 for his preferred option (and 0 for other). If the cost of voting is 0, everyone votes and there is a tie that is broken randomly. Hence, the social surplus is the expected value of a preferred choice:
Now say the cost of voting is c 2 3 . Suppose there is an equilibrium where only those with a high value will vote. In this case, if there is indeed a high value, then we are guaranteed that someone will value the winner v h = 5. Otherwise (when both voters have low values), the winner will be worth v`= 1. There is at least one high value 3=4 of the time. Thus, the surplus is In this example, we compare two situations, one with costly voting and one with free voting, and …nd that, in fact, costly voting is superior. Hence, adding a cost to voting can be welfare enhancing. This captures the intuition behind this phenomena, namely, with costly voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur the cost to voting, while with free voting, all values are counted equally regardless of how valuable they may be.
Notice that there are two important components of this model that enable costly voting to be superior to free voting. First, the di¤erence between the high value and low value must be large enough. If instead of 5, the value were 3, then costly voting would be inferior. (Social surplus with costly voting would be and with free voting the social surplus would be 2.) Second, the probability of having a low value should be su¢ciently large. For instance, if instead of 1=2 this was 1=4, then again costly voting would be inferior.
We see this further in Table 1 Underneath is the social surplus including voting costs di¤erence when both voters have a low value v`. When one voter has a low value and one voter has a high value, there is a net gain. The expected value of the winner goes up from 3 to 5 with a cost of voting of 2=3. However, when both voters have a high value, there is a net loss. The expected value of the winner is the same under both regimes, but both voters incur the cost of 2=3. The gains in the two states are higher the higher the di¤erence between both values. The odds of both having high values relative to just one having a high value is reduced the higher the chance of a low type.
Let us examine the model with a general v`and v h , and with p denoting the probability of having a low value. By analysis similar to that in Table 1 , the gains from voting is by having a voter with a high value instead of a low value in the upper right and lower left corners of the table.
This gain is realized half the time since with free voting the voter with the high type will win the coin ‡ip half the time. Hence, the di¤erence is (v h v`)=2. We are in these two boxes with chance 2p(1 p). In expectation, the gain is then (v h v`)p(1 p). Since each voter will only vote with a high type, the cost of voting is 2(1 p)c. Dividing both the gain and cost by (1 p), we see there is a net gain to voting if (v h v`)p 2c. This would be an equilibrium if v h =2 c v`=2. Again, we see that for there to exist a bene…t of costly voting, relative to the voting cost, the di¤erence between the high value and low value must be large enough as well as the probability of a low type.
However, for the bene…t it must also be an equilibrium for only a voter with a high value to vote. This requires that the cost is such that twice of it is between the high and low values. In the next two sections, we will see that insight gained from this example carries over to more general models.
3 Aggregate Supporter Certainty
Model
Here we model a committee making a binary decision such as which of two districts, A or B, to build a casino. There are an equal number of representatives from each district, and each representative has a private value for it being built in his district and a common cost for showing up to vote. the winner is determined randomly with equal probability of each winning. Note that the voter's preferences for platform A or B is modelled in the style of Rosenthal (1983, 1985) .
Equilibrium and social surplus
Denote v (c) as a cuto¤ strategy such that a voter i votes if his value is above v (c) and doesn't vote if his value is below v (c). We denote Pr i (eventjv ) as the probability that event occurs
given that all voters except voter i follows cuto¤ strategy v (c) and voter i does not vote.
A voter i where 1 i n (a type A) and with value v i will vote if
The expression Pr i (# A = # B jv ) represents the case when all other votes are tied. Hence, voter i is pivotal since by i voting, the outcome will change the vote from a tie to a win by voting.
The expression Pr i (# A = # B 1jv ) represents the case when voter i will change the outcome of a vote from losing to a tie. The gains in either instance is half the value,
Lemma 1 A cuto¤ v (c) forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if
Proof. The cuto¤ will be such that the value for voting equals the cost.
When the voter i prefers A (i n); we can rewrite the probabilities in this equation as follows:
and
Substituting these expressions into the cuto¤ value equation yields:
Since the equilibrium entails the probability of being pivotal equalling twice costs over bene…ts, the above equation resembles the equilibrium condition in Rosenthal (1983, 1985) . This equation can then be simpli…ed as
The same equation holds for voters preferring B (i > n):
Lemma 2 When there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v (0) = 0:
Proof. This follows directly from equation (1).
Proof. Equation (1) must hold for all c, so we can take the derivative w.r.t. c and take the limit as c ! 0. As c ! 0; we have v ! 0 (from Lemma 2), so lim v!0 (1 F ) = 1; lim v!0 F = 0: Notice that from this we need only worry about the term when i = n 1: (For n > 1, the rest vanish.)
This yields:
:
Lemma 4 The social surplus to voting is the expected value of the winner minus the costs of voting:
The expected value of the winner is computed by going through the possible number of voters for each candidate where a is the votes for candidate A and b is the votes for candidate B. The probability of each case is calculated and multiplied by the expected value of the winner, which is calculated by the expected value of those that voted for the winner plus the expected value of those that wanted the winner to win but nonetheless didn't vote for him. The expression 2n(1 F (v (c)))c is the expected cost of the voters voting since 1 F (v (c)) is the probability of each voter voting and there are n voters of each type.
When is it optimal to have a voting cost?
In the following proposition, we derive the conditions when it is optimal to have a cost. Proof. To show that it is optimal to have c > 0, it is su¢cient to show that lim c!0 SSV 0 (c) > 0.
We will prove this by showing that the derivative of the expected value of the voters that prefer the winning candidate is higher than the derivative of the expected costs. 
which goes to zero unless a+b = 2n 1 in which case it goes to n a n b F 0 v c . Note that a+b = 2n 1 when either a = n and b = n 1 or vice-versa. In each case, n a n b = n. Let us now look at the sum of the values times the derivative of the probabilities. When
When a + b = 2n 1; we also have (n maxfa;
Thus, when multiplied by the derivative of the probabilities and summed over the possible values for a and b, the limit goes to 0.
We are left with the sum of the probabilities times the derivative of the values. As we saw above, as c goes to 0 the only time the probabilities are non-zero is when a = b = n. Thus,
Hence, lim c!0
0) > 0 and it is optimal to increase costs.
Note that even though there is a unique equilibrium at c = 0, when c > 0, there is a possibility of multiple equilibria (see Rosenthal, 1983, 1985) . However, even if this is the case, under these conditions we have shown that all of the equilibria must yield higher social surplus than the equilibrium when c = 0.
Of the three conditions of Proposition 1, the …rst two,
are fairly innocuous. Anytime F 0 (0) is …nite they are satis…ed. The last condition,
is the one of interest and has two components that depend upon the distribution of v: the density at zero and the expected value. The combination of these two components must be large enough.
Too low a value of the density at zero would mean that increasing cost does not eliminate enough low value votes. Too low an expected value would mean that the bene…t to eliminating these low-value voters is not large enough. This condition is equivalent to lim c!0 In Figure 3 , the voters to the left of the vertical line do not vote when c is at the optimal level.
We now ask: in our example, for which is there a gain in surplus to increasing the cost of voting?
For n = 1, the slope of the surplus w.r.t. c is We also see that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satis…ed in Example 1 for 1=2 < 1.
We have E[v] = +1 and for 0 < < 1,
We also demonstrate with this example that Proposition 1's conditions are su¢cient but not necessary.
4 Aggregate supporter uncertainty.
Model and Initial Results
In the previous section, we assumed that there were an equal number of supporters for either A or B.
Here we assume there are n voters and each voter has an equal and independent chance of desiring each outcome. This leads to aggregate supporter uncertainty (ASU). Again, each voter has a level of support for his desired outcome drawn according to the non-atomic cumulative distribution function F with support [0; v], where v > 2c. The voter preferences over platforms is similar in style to that in Börgers (2000 Börgers ( , 2004 , we will discuss the di¤erences later.
In the following lemma, we show there is a unique equilibrium and determine its cuto¤ condition.
Lemma 5 There is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium with cuto¤ v (c) that satis…es
Proof. There are n voters overall. Take the decision of an individual voter. Consider each case where exactly a other voters vote. This occurs with probability
If a is even, this voter is pivotal only if there is a tie. This happens if exactly a=2 vote for each outcome, which occurs with probability a a=2 1 2 a . If a is odd then the voter is pivotal if there is exactly one less voter that votes for his preferred outcome. This has (a 1)=2 voting for his outcome and (a + 1)=2 voting for the other outcome. This occurs with probability
Using the above forms equation (4). The LHS of (4) is 0 when v = 0. The LHS equals v when v = v which is larger than 2c. Hence, since the LHS is continuous, there exists an interior solution to the equation. Finally, we want to show uniqueness. The probability of being pivotal given that a other voters vote is decreasing in a. As v increases the distribution of the number of other voters stochastically shifts downwards. Hence, as v increases, the overall probability of being pivotal increases. Thus, the LHS of (4) is strictly increasing in v and we have a unique solution.
Lemma 6 When there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v (0) = 0:
Proof. This follows directly from equation (4).
Proof. We can then take the total derivative w.r.t. c of the cuto¤ equation (4).
If lim v!0 F 0 (v)v = 0; then the only term remaining on the LHS is when a = n 1. Thus,
if n is odd, (see Weisstein, 2010) . Note that the double factorial; n!!; is either all strictly positive even numbers up to n multiplied together or all strictly positive odd numbers up to n multiplied together depending upon whether n is even or odd.
(1 F (v (c)))n c:
Taking the limit as c ! 0 of the derivative yields:
and lim c!0 
if n is odd, (n 1)!! (n 2)!! if n is even.
(n 1)
Look at the case when n is even. We have: Note that if we try the same method when n is odd, we have:
n!! (n 3)!! n = n. Now this is never greater than zero. Hence, in that case, using this method we are unable to determine when it is optimal to have a positive cost when n is odd.
Notice that the condition with aggregate supporter uncertainty E[v] F 0 (0) > 1 2 and an even number of voters is weaker than that when there is certainty E[v] F 0 (0) > 1 (which by our assumptions also has an even number of total voters). Thus, for all distributions where it would be worthwhile to have voting costs without uncertainty in number of supporters for each outcome, it would also be worthwhile to have positive voting costs with such supporter uncertainty.
What is the optimal level of voting?
We saw in the previous subsection that voting, even if it is costly, can have bene…ts to social surplus.
However, in the previous subsections, who voted was determined by equilibrium conditions. In this subsection, we wish to ask what should be the correct level of voting for society. This is the equivalent of asking if a social planner can decide a critical level of value only above which people should vote, what should it be?
Finding this level allows us to compare the optimal level to the equilibrium level. We can then ask what policy recommendations we can give to induce this level -having penalties for not voting or adding a poll tax. These penalties and taxes are just transfers and thus do not a¤ect overall welfare. 7 Remember, in contrast, a cost of voting yields no direct bene…t to anyone and given 7 Another method would be to employ some criteria for voting that re ‡ects values. For instance, Je¤erson felt the same voting outcome is a waste to society. In the following proposition, we can compare the equilibrium with the optimal level of voting.
Proposition 3 Under ASU, (i) there is overvoting (ii) there should be no …nes to encourage voting (no mandatory voting) (iii) there should be a poll tax to discourage voting.
Proof. A voter's vote will be pivotal in two instances. Case (A): when there is a tie in votes without his vote. Case (B): when the other candidate leads by 1 without his vote. In case (A), there will be no externality imposed since the other voters balance each other out. For case (B), the net externality imposed by a voter on others by voting is E [vjv > v ] . This externality is negative and a voter doesn't take this into account. Thus, in an optimal there should be less voting. Formalizing this logic, the optimal cuto¤ (if interior) should then solve:
From this equation, the equilibrium cuto¤ will then be lower than the optimal cuto¤. To see this the LHS is similar to the LHS of equation (4) but (v E[vjv > v ] ) multiplied by one of the probabilities instead of v , which is then smaller. Since the LHS of (4) is increasing in v . The LHS of (4) will be smaller than 2c for all v less than the equilibrium cuto¤. Consequently, the LHS of (6) is smaller than 2c for all v less than the equilibrium cuto¤. Hence, the solution to (6) must be higher than the equilibrium cuto¤. Since the optimal level of voting is lower than the equilibrium level, a government could charge for voting in order to implement the optimal cuto¤. This would be change the c in equation (4) such that the v that solves that the solution of equation (4) matches the solution to the equation (6). Note that while (6) may have more than one solution, all solutions would be at a higher v , then the equilibrium. Also, the only possible non-interior optimal cuto¤ for c > 0 is where no one votes (it can never be socially optimal for a zero-valued voter to vote).
Thus again, the optimal cuto¤ would be higher than the equilibrium. Börgers (2000 Börgers ( , 2004 develops a model with costly voting and shows (in Börgers, 2004 ) that only the educated should vote (Padover 1952, page 43 ). In our model, they would have better information and hence higher values for certain candidates. There have also been literacy and property ownership as requirements. While literacy might have been used to disenfranchise certain minority groups, a property ownership requirement for the most part was to restrict voting to groups that had a stake in the country (high values).
the unique equilibrium is superior to both mandatory voting still with voting costs (or equivalently bribing people to vote) and random choice (with no one voting). He also graphically shows (in Börgers, 2000) that the unique equilibrium may be superior to one with lower voting costs, but importantly did not show that it is superior to one with zero voting costs. With the technique used in the above proposition, it becomes apparent that Börgers (2004) also has overvoting. 8 The main di¤erence of our model to that of Börgers (2000 Börgers ( , 2004 ) is that we allow for di¤erent intensities of preferences while Börgers (2000 Börgers ( , 2004 has di¤erent voting costs. In both models, it is always optimal to charge a poll tax when there is a positive cost of voting; however, only in our model is it worthwhile to have a poll tax when the cost of voting is zero. This is because when the marginal voter has a value of 0 and when pivotal (moving from a loss to a tie) is replacing a voter with a higher value. In Börgers (2000 Börgers ( , 2004 , it is optimal to have all voters voting when there is zero voting costs, since everyone has the same valuation (in absolute terms) and thus this will maximize the information aggregated.
There are no restrictions on F for a poll tax to be optimal. The tax is a transfer unlike a wasteful cost of voting so is a superior alternative. It is not clear that a poll tax is politically viable. This then leads to our previous sub-section where it may be worthwhile to maintain (or even induce) a cost of voting. Doing so eliminates voters with little intensity for their preferred candidate.
Conclusion
Since the nineteenth century, political scientists have been in agreement that increasing the franchise will be bene…cial to the society (Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, page 19) . So over the last century in democracies, the right to vote has been given to most of the adult society and the requirements of registration to vote such as property quali…cations have been removed. Social scientists have further asked the question whether or not it makes sense to require people to vote. In addition this requirement to vote also gets around the paradox that since each individual may …nd his vote negligible will choose not to vote if there is a cost to voting. We show that not only should one not require people to vote but there is a distinct bene…t to having some people not vote and increasing the (wasteful) cost to voting may paradoxically be bene…cial to society. (Note increasing a wasteful cost of voting may be politically more viable than imposing a poll tax.) For instance, if a committee has an important vote, scheduling the meeting at an inconvenient time may improve the outcome.
This also shows that allowing absentee ballots or internet voting can be damaging. 9 Since this is the …rst paper to show that it may be bene…cial having costly voting (over costless voting), there are many directions of future research where one can expand the result. One direction is to increase the number of alternatives on the ballot to more than two. With committee voting this seems quite logical. Furthermore, once this is done, one can introduce approval voting to ameliorate strategic voting (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978) . Another direction is to introduce a common value element in addition to a private value as in Osborne and Turner (2010) .
